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REGINA V. MURPHY AND LANGUAGE RIGHTS 
LEGISLATION*
Robert W. K errt
Before examining the existing and proposed legislation on 
language rights in the courts, both federal and provincial, it is de­
sirable to review briefly the previously existing state of the law in 
New Brunswick. One of the rules of interpretation is that legis­
lation will be interpreted in the light of the previously existing law.
The definitive statement on the state of law in New Bruns­
wick prior to any contemporary legislation is undoubtedly the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Murphy.1 Although 
this judgment was rendered after the enactment of one major piece 
of contemporary legislation in New Brunswick, namely s. 23C of 
the Evidence Act, enacted in 19672, the Court held that this legis­
lation did not affect a criminal case. Since there was no federal 
legislation on the matter, the state of law prior to Confederation 
applied. Further, it would follow that until the 1967 legislation 
the law of New Brunswick in all proceedings, civil and criminal, 
was that set out in the judgment of Hughes J.A., since there was 
no provincial legislation on the matter prior to 1967.
The decision in the Murphy case was that English is the 
language in which court proceedings in New Brunswick must be 
held. I submit that a reform-minded bench could have reached a 
different conclusion in that case, but then, as indicated by the 
words of Hughes J.A., the bench was not reform-minded. In his 
view:
It is, however, the function of this Court to interpret and apply 
the law, not to remake it, that being the responsibility of Par­
liament and o f the Legislature.3
But even without a reform-minded bench, I submit that there are 
weaknesses in the judgment in the Murphy case, and that the
* This is a paper prepared for delivery at the mid-winter meeting 
of the Canadian Bar Association (N .B . Branch) at Saint John on 
Feb. 13-15, 1969. 
t  Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick,
i (1 9 6 8 ), 69 D.L.R. (2d ) 530.
2 S. N . B. 1967, c. 37, s. 1. S. 23 C states: “In any proceeding in any 
court in the Province, at the request o f any party, and if all the 
parties to the action or proceedings and their counsel have suffic­
ient knowledge of any language, the Judge may order that the pro­
ceedings be conducted and the evidence given and taken in that 
language.”
3 (1 9 6 8 ), 69 D.L.R. (2d ) 530, at p. 535.
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elimination of these weaknesses might have left the Court with a 
choice as to the result.
At the outset I would make it clear that I am not going to 
dispute the constitutional ruling in the case. The Court proceeded 
with this issue on the ground that the language in which a court 
proceeding is conducted is more than a rule of evidence which in­
volves the admission or rejection of certain types of evidence. The 
Court concluded that the language of the proceedings was a basic 
question of procedure. Under s. 9 1 (27 ) of the British North 
America Act, procedure in criminal matters is a federal power, and 
cannot be regulated by a provincial legislature. Evidence itself, 
of course, is a matter of procedure, but federal law incorporates 
provincial laws of evidence under s. 36 of the Canada Evidence 
Act.4 But it would be going rather far to suggest that under this 
section Parliament intended to incorporate provincial law on 
something as distinct from the rules of evidence as the language in 
which the entire process shall be conducted.
That still leaves the question as to what was the pre-Con- 
federation law of New Brunswick on language in the courts. The 
Court in the Murphy case found the pre-Confederation law to be 
stated in two English statutes, one, 12 Car. II, c. 3, adopted in 
1650 during the Commonwealth and repealed in 1660 upon the 
Restoration, and the other, 4 Geo. II, c. 26, adopted in 1731 to 
take effect in 1733 and which was still in effect in 1784.
In determining whether either or both of these old English 
statutes are part of the law of New Brunswick, it seems desirable 
to distinguish between the two possible methods by which they 
might have been introduced into the law of New Brunswick. These 
methods are by reception of English law into the common law of 
New Brunswick and by express application of the English law to 
New Brunswick. The difference between these two methods lies 
in the fact that reception is a common law concept, while express 
application involves the interpretation of some legislative instru­
ment. The legislative instrument could be a statute of either the 
British Parliament or the New Brunswick Assembly, or an order of 
either the British Privy Council or the Executive Council of New 
Brunswick.
In Ontario and some of the Western Provinces it is unnecessary 
to distinguish between reception and express application for com­
mon law reception has been covered by statute in those juris­
dictions and becomes a matter of legislative interpretation also.
* R.S.C. 1952, c. 307.
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The rule as to reception of English statute law into the law of 
New Brunswick was considered in the 1830’s by Chipman J. in 
two cases, Rex  v. McLaughlin5 and Doe d. Hannington v. M ’Fad- 
den6. In the McLaughlin case, Chipman J. dealt primarily with the 
date relevant for reception of English statutes into New Bruns­
wick. He concluded that English statutes adopted prior to the 
Restoration were considered as extending to the colonies “if ap­
plicable to [the] colonial condition”, but later statutes were not 
unless expressly stated to extend to the colonies. The reason for 
this dividing line was that after the Restoration the British Parlia­
ment began including in statutes provisions that expressly ex­
tended the statute to the colonies. These provisions raised a pre­
sumption that in the absence of such a provision the statute did not 
extend to the colony.
In the Hannington case, Chipman C. J. quoted with approval 
Blackstone’s statement of the general rule of reception:
Colonists carry with them only so much o f the English law 
as is applicable to their own situation, and the condition o f an 
English Colony; such for instance as the general rules o f  inheri­
tance; and o f protection from personal injuries.7
Since the Hannington case involved a pre-Restoration statute, the 
rule of common law reception appears to be that pre-Restoration 
statutes were received into the common law of New Brunswick if 
applicable to the situation of the Province, while post-Restoration 
statutes were received into New Brunswick law if they expressly 
extended to the colonies.
On the basis of this rule, the English statute of 1731 could not 
have become part of the law of New Brunswick by common law 
reception. It was a post-Restoration statute. It expressly applied 
only to England and Scotland. If further evidence of its limited 
application is desired, an express amendment was considered 
necessary in 1733 to extend it to Wales.
5 ( 1830), 1 N.B.R. 218.
6 (1 8 3 6 ), 2 N .B.R . 153. In spite o f citations to the contrary in the 
Canadian Abridgment and the D.L.R. report o f Hughes J. A .’s judg­
ment, 2 N .B.R . 153 is the correct citation. The Abridgment and the 
D.L.R. report, citing 2 N .B.R . 260, appear to have been led astray by 
Stockton’s second edition o f Breton’s Reports which are now cited 
as 2 N .B.R . Stockton added extensive annotation to Breton’s Reports, 
resulting in the addition o f many pages to the pagination in Breton’s 
edition. However, Stockton also indicated the original pagination, so 
no double citation seems necessary to enable the user of either edition  
to find material in the Report.
7 Ibid., at p. 159.
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The question remains whether the English statute of 1650 
became part of New Brunswick law by common law reception. 
The only factor pointing in favour of its reception is that it was 
a pre-Restoration statute. There are two other important factors 
against its reception which the Court in the Murphy case did not 
consider adequately. Moreover, there is a fourth factor which is 
the most important of all, but which the Court in the Murphy case 
dealt with only indirectly. It is on this fourth point that there 
would have been an opportunity for the Court to have reached a 
different result in so far as reception of the English law was con­
cerned.
The two factors against reception of the English statute of 
1650 were the express terms of the statute and its repeal in 1660. 
By its terms the statute of 1650 applied to “Courts of Justice within 
this Commonwealth". It is submitted that these words do not in 
their natural sense include the overseas colonies. Even at that 
time the colonies were administratively distinct from the territory 
of Great Britain which constituted the Commonwealth. While pre- 
Restoration statutes of general application might be presumed part 
of the law of the colonies, it does not follow that pre-Restoration 
statutes expressly limited in their application to Great Britain 
should be considered part of the law of the colonies.
The judgment in the Murphy case ignores the repeal of the 
statute of 1650 on the basis that as a post-Restoration statute the 
repeal did not become part of colonial law unless expressly ex­
tended to the colonies. However, it should at least be considered 
whether that rule is to be applied unreservedly to repealing statutes. 
The effect of a repealing statute is to remove the former statute 
from the law for future time. Although 1660 may be the dividing 
line for presuming in favour of or against the adoption of English 
statutes into New Brunswick law, it can hardly be considered as the 
actual date of reception. The whole basis of reception is that the 
colonists bring the common law with them. New Brunswick was 
clearly not settled by English colonists until after 1660. When­
ever the English law was received, therefore, the 1650 statute was 
simply not law at all.
The final factor, and the most important one, is whether the 
statute of 1650 was applicable to the condition of the colony. 
Except to indicate that circumstances have changed since the es­
tablishment of New Brunswick in 1784, the Court in the Murphy 
case never examines the applicability of the English language 
statutes to New Brunswick’s circumstances at any time. The rele­
vant date is probably 1784. While French is undoubtedly the 
mother tongue of a larger proportion of New Brunswickers today
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than it was in 1784 after the invasion of the Loyalists, there was 
nonetheless substantial French settlement in 1784. While the 
central organs of government were firmly in the hands of the 
Loyalists, we should remember that the Murphy case was dealing, 
not with the central courts of New Brunswick, but with a Magis­
trates Court. Magistrates Courts have at least some relationship 
with the history of local courts in New Brunswick. It is sub­
mitted that the Court in the Murphy case should at least have 
made some examination of the circumstances in which local courts 
in New Brunswick were established to determine the applicability 
of the English language statutes to those courts. Moreover, since 
the historical evidence on these matters is generally unsatisfactory, 
it might well have been a case for the Court to examine present 
practices on the assumption that these are merely manifestations 
of what the law is and has always been. If this had been done, 
it might have appeared that French is used as a working language 
in many Magistrates Courts. Consequently, the English language 
statutes might have been found not to be nor to ever have been 
applicable to the procedure in Magistrates Courts.
On the question of express application, the relevant docu­
ments appear to be the commissions issued to the first Judges of 
the Supreme Court in 1784. These provided for the hearing of 
cases “according to the laws, statutes and customs of that part of 
our Kingdom of Great Britain called England, and the laws of our 
said Province of New Brunswick, not being repugnant thereto.'’ 
The judges were also empowered:
to award, and to act, and do all things which any of our Justices 
of either Bench or Barons of the Exchequer in England may or 
ought to do; and to make such rules and orders in our said court 
as shall be judged useful and convenient, and as near as may be, 
agreeable to the rules and orders o f our Courts of King’s Bench, 
Com m on Pleas, and Exchequer, in England.
While these instructions could be interpreted, not so much to 
adopt English procedural law, as to adopt English substantive law 
and empower the Court itself to determine its procedure on Eng­
lish models, it appears that the courts of New Brunswick have 
regarded this as an express adoption of much English procedure. 
Hughes J. A. cites a number of precedents to that effect. The rule 
of law which he draws from the precedents is that “the Court by 
virtue of the Royal Instructions adopted all the practice of the 
Court of King’s Bench of England considered applicable.”8 This 
statement of the rule is taken from the argument of Mr. Gray for
8 (1 9 6 8 ), 69 D.L.R. (2d ) 530, at pp. 534-535.
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the plaintiff in Milner v. Gilbert.9 Chipman C.J., in delivering 
the judgment in the Milner case, preferred to rely on a later New 
Brunswick statute expressly adopting the English rule in issue. 
But since the Court in the Murphy case chose Mr. Gray’s statement 
of the rule, they and we must abide by it.
The question remains whether, through the adoption of 
English procedure by the courts of New Brunswick, the English 
statutes became part of the law of New Brunswick. On this aspect 
of the question, the English statute of 1650 can be as summarily 
dismissed as the English statute of 1731 can be dismissed in the 
case of common law reception. The references to English law in 
the instructions to the first New Brunswick Judges must surely 
have referred to English law and procedure as it existed in 1784. 
The English statute of 1650 had long since been repealed.
Of course, this immediately raises the question of how one 
reconciles the instructions to the common law rule of reception 
in New Brunswick providing for adoption only of pre-Restoration 
statutes. It would appear that the instructions have been inter­
preted as relating only to procedure, and not to substantive law. 
The McLaughlin case, which set out the pre-Restoration rule for 
reception of statutes, involved a substantive rule, as did subsequent 
cases which have applied that rule.10 On the other hand, all of the 
cases involving procedural questions refer to adoption at the date 
of the instructions to the Judges or later statutes, and make no 
distinction between pre-Restoration and post-Restoration English 
statutes.11 In other words, statutes relating to substantive law be­
came part of the law of New Brunswick by common law reception 
with the Restoration as a key date in determining whether the pre­
sumption is for or against reception. In matters of procedure, on 
the other hand, express application through the instructions to the 
Judges and later New Brunswick statutes brought English proce­
dure at the date of the adopting instrument into the law of New 
Brunswick.
Of course, this raises a strong indication that the English 
statute of 1731 did become part of the law of New Brunswick. It 
was part of the procedure of the English courts in 1784 when the 
instructions to the Judges were issued. That the English statute of
9 (1 8 4 7 ), 5 N.B.R. 617, at pp. 621-622.
10 See the Hannington  case supra fn. 6; also B oyd  v. Fudge (1 9 6 5 ), 46 
D.L.R. (2d ) 679, 50 M.P.R. 384 (N .B .C .A .).
11 See the M ilner case supra fn. 9; also G ilbert v. Sayre (1 8 5 2 ), 7 N.B.R. 
512; M arks v. G ilm our  (1 8 5 5 ), 8 N.B.R. 170; and K err  v. Burns 
(1 8 6 0 ), 9 N.B.R. 604.
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1731 was by its terms applicable only to England and Scotland, 
and later Wales, would not matter because it was the procedure in 
England that was adopted.
But it appears that the adoption of English procedure by the 
New Brunswick courts was not without limitations. In Attorney- 
General v. Baillie,12 for instance, the Supreme Court held that it 
had no jurisdiction in equity, although the instructions to the 
Judges included reference to Exchequer and Exchequer included 
a court of equity as well as a court of common law. The state­
ment of the rule quoted above in the Murphy case seems quite 
appropriate —  that the practice of the English courts considered 
applicable was adopted.
The key factor is whether the English law was applicable to 
New Brunswick. Again the Court in the Murphy case might have 
given more attention to the circumstances in New Brunswick in 
which the English law was adopted. The same considerations 
would apply as stated earlier with respect to common law recep­
tion of the English statute of 1650. The Court might have ulti­
mately relied on the practice of Magistrates Courts in recent 
times in New Brunswick as evidence of a continuation of ancient 
procedure. This approach should have given the Court a choice 
as to whether it would decide, as it did, that English was the only 
language properly used in New Brunswick courts prior to con­
temporary legislation, or that some use of French as a working 
language was permissible.
It must be admitted that the Court would have had to work 
harder to reach a result different from that it reached in the 
Murphy case. Even if the Court had found the use of French as a 
working language permissible, it still would not have established 
that the judge of the Magistrates Court was outside his jurisdiction13 
in deciding that this particular trial should be conducted in English. 
It was certainly much easier for the Court to pile together the 
precedents in favour of adoption of the English law and thus make 
the judgment of the trial judge not only right as a matter of dis­
cretion, which it probably was anyway, but also a judgment re­
quired by law. But the fact remains that the Court took the easier 
path on this matter, and in the course of taking the easier path by­
passed intensive analysis of the precedents. This suggests that the 
Court may, however unconsciously, be taking a position out of step 
with contemporary thinking on the matter of language rights as 
expressed in proposed federal and existing and proposed New 
Brunswick legislation on language rights.
»2 (1 8 4 2 ), 3 N.B.R. 443.
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Existing and proposed federal and New Brunswick legislation 
consists of:
(1 ) Section 23C of the Evidence Act of New Brunswick13 
which provides that, in any court proceeding in the Province, the 
judge may order proceedings conducted and evidence given and 
taken in any language if the parties to the proceedings and their 
counsel have sufficient knowledge of the language;
(2 ) Section 133 of the British North America Act which 
provides that in any federal court proceeding any person may use 
either English or French;
(3 ) Section 11 (1 ) of Bill C-120 now before Parliament 
which provides that in any federal court and in a criminal pro­
ceeding in any court evidence may be given and persons appearing 
may speak in either English or French without being placed at any 
disadvantage as a result;
(4 ) Section 11 (2 ) of Bill C-120 which provides that 
every federal court, when holding proceedings in the National 
Capital Region or in one of the federal bilingual districts created 
under the proposed legislation, shall provide simultaneous trans­
lation if feasible;
(5 ) Section 11 (3 ) of Bill C -120 which provides that in 
any criminal proceeding a court in its discretion on the request 
of any accused person may order the proceedings to be conducted 
in either English or French as requested by the accused if that is 
feasible:
(6 ) A proposal in the “Statement on Language Equality 
and Opportunity” tabled in the New Brunswick Legislative As­
sembly on December 4, 1968, that any person charged with an 
offence should have the right to be tried in English or French, 
according to his choice;
(7 ) The objective declared by the government of New 
Brunswick in the “Statement on Language Equality and Oppor­
tunity” that court process be available to persons in English or 
French according to their choice.
Since the last two provincial proposals have not yet been 
made public in legislative language, it is not possible to comment 
on any problems of interpretation that they may create. The 
major problems of interpretation surrounding most of the pro­
visions which now exist in legislative language involve the con­
siderations of convenience that are allowed for. In section 23C of
J3 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 74, as amended by S.N.B. 1967, c. 37, s. 1. re­
produced in fn. 2.
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the Evidence Act these considerations are expressed in these 
terms —  “if all the parties to the action or proceedings and their 
counsel have sufficient knowledge of [the] language.” Under 
Section 11 (2 ) of Bill C-120, simultaneous translation facilities 
need not be provided if “such facilities cannot conveniently be 
made available” or if “the court, after making every reasonable 
effort to obtain such facilities, is unable to obtain them.” In 
section 11 (3 ) of Bill C-120 the proceedings may be in one 
language “if it appears to the court that the proceedings can 
effectively be conducted and the evidence can effectively be taken 
wholly or mainly in one of the official languages”. These quali­
fications are likely to be the subject of some legal dispute. If a 
particular court takes an unreceptive view of the rights of persons 
to have proceedings in a particular official language, it would seem 
that these provisions will allow it considerable scope to avoid the 
would-be impact of this legislation.
Of course, it should be noted that under section 11 (1 ) 
of Bill C-120, the first presumption is that in any proceeding af­
fected by federal law a person has a right to speak in either 
English or French. This is in substance true bilingualism. The 
onus is on the court to specifically order that proceedings be 
limited to one language. The only problem is that, where people 
in fact are not generally bilingual, the right to speak in a language 
which others around you do not generally understand may not be 
of much use, whatever the law says about a person “in being so 
heard . . . will not be placed at a disadvantage”. It is in the simul­
taneous translation provision that the federal legislation may have 
its most substantial effect, and at present this provision is very 
easy to avoid. Mere inconvenience in obtaining simultaneous 
translation is sufficient to render them unnecessary. Moreover, this 
provision applies only to federal courts in which at present, pur­
suant to section 133 of the British North America Act, persons 
may use the language of their choice.
One other problem which arises is as to what is a provincial 
court and what is a federal court.
The Murphy case does not appear to have raised any argu­
ment that in criminal matters any court was a federal court, but in 
Regina v. Watts'* such an argument was rejected. The test applied 
was that since the appointment and jurisdiction of the Magistrates 
Court was governed by provincial legislation, it was clearly a pro­
vincial court. Of course, the Court was clearly wrong in saying 
this. Part of the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court was gov-
(1 9 6 8 ), 69 D.L.R. (2d ) 526 (B .C .S .C .).
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eraed by federal law, including its jurisdiction in the Watts case 
itself. But the implication is clear that it is the substantial basis of 
the court’s composition and jurisdiction that characterizes it as 
provincial or federal. The Watts case was approvingly referred to 
in the Murphy case, although without specific reference to this 
point. It was recently affirmed on appeal.15
Many courts in Canada depend substantially on both federal 
and provincial law for their existence and jurisdiction. For these 
courts it is likely to be some time before the exact application 
of language rights legislation will be worked out by the process of 
judicial interpretation.
There are a number of cases dealing with powers of the 
different levels of government in Canada to create and assign juris­
diction to courts. A number of these are relevant on the question 
of whether a particular court is for a particular purpose a federal 
or a provincial court.1“ But none of these cases states any general 
test that would help determine in all cases when a court is pro­
vincial and when a court is federal for the purposes of the language 
rights legislation. In the present state of the law, case by case de­
terminations respecting particular courts, and possibly specific 
nomination of specific courts in language rights legislation, may be 
necessary. The existing and proposed legislation, however, deals 
only in broad general terms with the courts as a whole.
An early resolution of what courts are bound in what way 
by proposed language rights legislation seems to depend on closely 
parallel provincial and federal legislation so that it will not matter 
whether the court is federal or provincial. The rights will be the 
same in any event. The legislative wording of the proposed New 
Brunswick legislation, and any amendments to the federal pro­
posal that may follow consultations with the provinces, will have 
to be studied closely.
An amendment to section 133 of the British North America 
Act may also be in order. This prescribes certain language rights 
for federal courts, as well as the provincial courts of Quebec, 
namely the right to speak at will in either English or French. With­
out an amendment, any attempt at parallel federal and provincial 
legislation which stops short of this will still be subject to uncer­
15 (1 9 6 8 ). 1 D.L.R. (3 d ) 239 (B .C .C .A .).
1,1 Sec Valin v. Langlois (1 8 7 9 ), 3 S.C.R. 1; W ard  v. R eed  (1 8 8 2 ), 22 
N.B.R. 279; Re Vancini (1 9 0 4 ), 34 S.C.R. 621, 8 C.C.C. 228; Re 
Sollowav, M ills Co. L td., [1937] O W N .  450, [1937] 4 D.L.R.
26 (C .A .).
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tainties. Federal courts will still be subject to the British North 
America Act rule, while other courts will be subject to the legis­
lative rule.
It has been suggested that the federal Official Languages Bill 
is unconstitutional. This conclusion is apparently based upon sec­
tion 91 (1 ) of the British North America Act which provides that 
Parliament may amend the Constitution of Canada except as re­
gards the use of English and French. Section 133 of the Act, 
which is admittedly part of the constitution of Canada, provides 
that either English or French may be used in the federal Par­
liament and in the federal and Quebec courts. This provision re­
gards the use of English and French. The Official Languages Bill 
amends the use of English and French by extension. It is therefore 
an amendment to the constitution of Canada as regards the use 
of English and French and is contrary to section 91 (1 ) of the 
B.N.A. Act. It is therefore unconstitutional.
This argument is syllogistically very neat. But it has a weak­
ness. There is one step too many. The Official Languages Bill 
amends the use of English and French. Section 91 (1 ) prohibits 
amendments to the constitution as regards the use of English and 
French; it does not prohibit amendments to the use of English 
and French. It says that Parliament may not amend the constitu­
tion respecting the use of English and French, not that Parliament 
may pass no law whatsoever respecting the use of English and 
French.
The B. N. A. Act in section 133 makes only a very limited 
provision regarding the use of English and French. Language 
rights in the sense that those rights are amended by the Official 
Languages Bill are a much broader subject than that covered by 
section 133. It is a most superficial argument to say that any 
change in the law with respect to this broader area of language 
rights is automatically an amendment to section 133. Surely 
section 133 must be considered within the scope of its own op­
eration. That operation is not affected in any way by the Official 
Languages Bill. The Bill is very careful to avoid any such change. 
In other words, just because the Official Languages Bill amends 
language rights in Canada, it does not follow that it amends the 
constitution of Canada.
On languages in the courts, subsection (1 ) of section 11 of 
the Official Languages Bill merely repeats the requirements of 
section 133 of the B. N. A. Act and extends it to provincial courts 
in criminal cases. Subsection (2 ) dealing with simultaneous trans­
lation does not stop the use of either English or French required 
by section 133. The person speaking continues to use the English
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or French according to his choice and the translator uses the other. 
Subsection (3 ) , providing for unilingual proceedings, is expressly 
limited by subsection (4 ) to courts to which section 133 does not 
apply. Thus, the Official Languages Bill does not amend this part 
of the constitution of Canada as regards the use of English or 
French.
Of course, it is also necessary to examine whether the Official 
Languages Bill amends any other provision of the constitution 
regarding the use of English and French. It is not clear what 
exactly makes up the constitution of Canada. It clearly includes 
the B. N. A. Act. It may also include certain other fundamental 
law relating to the government of Canada. But it is submitted that 
section 133 is the only readily apparent provision relating to the 
use of English and French in any of the law that might be regarded 
as part of the constitution of Canada.
In interpreting section 91 (1 ) of the British North America 
Act it is useful to look at the previous state of the law and the 
purpose of section 91 (1 ) . Prior to the enactment of section 91 
(1 ) , it is submitted Parliament could clearly have passed the 
Official Languages Bill. It falls within Parliament’s power to 
regulate its own institutions, including the federal courts and civil 
service, its power to regulate procedure in criminal cases, and its 
power to spend money as it sees fit. Parliament lacked power to 
amend the B. N. A. Act, including section 133 of the Act, but 
again the Official Languages Bill does not amend section 133 or 
any other provision of the B. N. A. Act. Section 9 1 (1 )  was added 
to the B. N. A. Act as a new head of specific power granted to 
Parliament. In view of the interpretation of section 91 of the 
B. N. A. Act by the courts, the specific heads of power are the 
principle sources of the power of Parliament. The obvious inten­
tion, therefore, was to expand Parliament’s powers by creating 
a new specific head of power. The limitations were upon this 
new power, not upon powers Parliament already had. Unless 
section 91 (1 ) compels such a result, therefore, it should not be 
read as limiting powers Parliament already had. As already shown, 
nothing in section 91 (1 ) compels such an interpretation. The 
limitation merely prevents Parliament from amending its con­
stitution in certain ways. With respect to the use of English and 
French, section 133 is the only relevant constitutional provision. 
The Official Languages Bill affects language rights entirely out­
side the scope of section 133. It does not, therefore, amend the 
constitution as regards the use of English and French, however 
much it may amend the larger field of language rights not touched 
by the constitution.
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Legislation of language rights in the courts in Canada is 
undoubtedly opening up a whole new field of issues that may be 
litigated. In view of the political aspects of this matter, I would 
add one caveat. It is to be hoped the legal profession will approach 
these issues with a view to the resolution which best suits not only 
the interests of their clients, but also the future of Canada as a 
nation.
A U T H O R ’S N O TE
Since this paper was originally written both the federal O f­
ficial Languages Act, S. C. 1968-69, c. 54, and the Official 
Languages of New Brunswick Act, S.N.B. 1969, c. 14, have been 
placed on the statute books. S. 14 of the New Brunswick A ct sets 
out language rights in the courts in substantially the same terms 
as the original federal bill, although this section has not yet been 
proclaimed. It creates a primary right for persons appearing and 
giving evidence to use the official language of their choice. Subject 
to this right, a court may order proceedings to be solely in either 
language.
The federal provision on language rights in the courts has 
been considerably diminished in scope from that proposed in Bill 
C-120. S. 11 (1) grants the primary right to use the official 
language of one’s own choice only to witnesses. Under the bill, 
as in the New Brunswick Act, parties and lawyers would have 
enjoyed the same right as witnesses, but under the federal A ct they 
have no such right.
In the federal Act, as in Bill C-120, the power of a court 
under s. 11 (3) to hold criminal proceedings solely in English or 
solely in French at the request of an accused person is not ap­
plicable to federal and Quebec courts where the use of both Eng­
lish and French is constitutionally guaranteed. In the federal A ct 
the power of a court under s. 11 (3) is further restricted to those 
provinces which provide a similar power in civil cases. A s a result 
in common law Canada an accused person will only be able to 
obtain a French trial in those provinces like New Brunswick 
which introduce language rights legislation. Although s. 14 of the 
New Brunswick A ct relating to language in the courts has not yet 
been proclaimed, the similar power created by s. 23C  of the 
Evidence Act would put s. 11 (3) of the federal A ct into force in 
New Brunswick at present.
This considerable reduction in the provision for language 
rights in the courts between the federal bill and the federal A ct was 
undoubtedly a concession to those provinces which strongly op ­
posed the federal A ct as a whole. It leaves little potential impact 
upon court proceedings in the federal Act. On the other hand.
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even in the bill the discretionary and feasibility qualifications on 
these rights allowed for minimal impact. It was probably a stra­
tegic retreat for the federal government to give way on these pro­
visions which would have little practical effect for some time and 
to concentrate on retaining other provisions with more immediate 
consequences. A s soon as the legal profession and institutions are 
in a position to offer adequate French language services through­
out Canada to accused persons, s. 11 can always be amended back 
into a more forceful form.
